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Public procurement accounts for a significant share of OECD countries’ expenditures. Therefore,
governments and public institutions are expected to execute them as efficiently as possible. Yet,
there is a lack of methods that allow for an adequate comparison of procurement activity between in-
stitutions at different scales, representing a challenge for policymakers and academics. Here, we use
methods from Urban Scaling Laws literature to study public procurement activity among 278 Por-
tuguese municipalities between 2011 and 2018. We find that public expenditure scales sub-linearly
with population size, indicating economies of scale for public spending as cities increase their pop-
ulation. The scaling behavior persists after desegregating by contract type, namely Works, Goods,
and Services. Moreover, using the Scale-Adjusted Indicators, which represent the deviations from
the scaling laws, we characterize different patterns of procurement activity among regional groups.
Thus, we obtain a new local characterization of municipalities based on the similarity of procure-
ment activity. Finally, we show the information value captured by the Scale-Adjusted Indicators
as they correlate with several regional economic indicators. These results make up a framework for
quantitatively study local public expenditure by enabling policymakers a more appropriate ground
for comparative analysis.
INTRODUCTION
Public procurement contracts are an essential public
sector instrument for policy-makers to effectively push-
forward inclusive socio-economic [1] and innovation [2–4]
policies. Among OECD countries, public procurement
weights, on average, 29% of all governmental expendi-
tures [1] (14%[5] among EU countries) and 12% of the
GDP. Given its past and current importance, the Euro-
pean Commission has established a common framework
for public procurement aimed at ensuring equal treat-
ment and transparency, reduce fraud and corruption and
remove legal administrative barriers to participation in
cross-border tenders [6]. In that sense, data on public
procurement contracts should also constitute the basis
for analytical frameworks that effectively evaluate the ef-
fectiveness and impact of public sector activities at dif-
ferent scales and dimensions. However, few studies have
explored adequate methodologies that account for non-
linearities in spending dynamics or examined the infor-
mation inference potential in public procurement data
[7]. That is, what can public procurement activities in-
form us about institutions?
Here, we use methods from Urban Scaling Laws (USL)
literature, rooted in statistical physics and complexity
sciences, to provide a characterization of public procure-
ment activity among Portuguese municipalities. USL [8–
11] has been used to describe the relationship between
socio-economic indicators and the population size of pop-
ulation agglomerates. It has invited for a rethinking of
existing urban planning frameworks and comparative in-
dicators [12] while raising the questions on the existence
of underlying universal laws in urban growth.
In general, USL models the relationship between an
indicator, Y , and the population size, X, of a set of pop-
ulation agglomerates (e.g., cities or urban areas) as a
power-law of the form
Y ≈ αXβ (1)
where β is the scaling factor and α represents a natural
baseline activity [13, 14]. Several indicators – water con-
sumption, housing, or number of jobs [15] – have been
shown to follow a linear relationship (β = 1.0). However,
the more interesting cases are those in which Y exhibits
a super-linear (β > 1) or sub-linear (β < 1) relationship
with the population size (X). Such cases identify in-
stances in which an indicator scales above (super-linear)
or below (sub-linear) the linear relationship, thus increas-
ing more or less, respectively, in a per capita basis. Super-
linear behavior has been documented in the region eco-
nomic output [16–22], energy consumption and pollution
[23–25], employment [26, 27] criminality [27–31], num-
ber of patents [22, 26, 30, 32], wages [30], employment
in R&D [30] and urbanized area [26]. Sub-linear rela-
tionships often include the total length of road network
[18, 30], energy supply networks [33]. In other cases, like
ar
X
iv
:2
00
7.
15
27
6v
1 
 [p
hy
sic
s.s
oc
-p
h]
  3
0 J
ul 
20
20
2supply networks, exhibit sub or super linear behaviour
depending on the industry [33], and voter turnout [34].
In sum, population agglomerates present clear trade-offs
between human activity outputs that increase from ag-
glomeration, and infrastructure costs that diminish with
agglomeration.
Previous works on USL have, but not always, focused
in cities [35]. However, cities do not necessarily define ad-
ministrative governance areas or the appropriate bound-
aries for human activity. It remains an open question
to which extend cities’ boundaries accurately represent
an appropriate population aggregation unit [9, 36, 37].
For instance, Arcaute et al [15] uses information on com-
muting times to define new boundaries, raising questions
about the accuracy of some scaling factors. Here, we fo-
cus on municipalities as they provide an appropriate bal-
ance between a regional unit of governance and a natural
population agglomerate. In Portugal, municipalities rep-
resent the second-largest administrative division whose
governance body is elected by universal suffrage. They
are also the administrative division with the most sta-
ble regional boundaries and upon which city governance
responsibility falls. Being, thus, a suitable candidate to
study the scaling behavior of procurement activity.
We start with a description of the data sources and
data pre-processing steps. Then, we characterize munici-
pality procurement activity using Urban Scaling Laws.
We show that Scale-Adjusted Indicators (the devia-
tions/residuals from the scaling laws) exhibit moder-
ate correlations to several regional economic indicators.
Moreover, the SAI can reveal differences in the procure-
ment activity patterns of different regions (groups of mu-
nicipalities). We conclude with final remarks and a dis-
cussion of future working directions.
DATA
We use data on Portuguese public procurement con-
tracts sourced from the open-access governmental portal
BASE (base.gov.pt). BASE is a public repository man-
aged by the Instituto dos Mercados Pblicos, do Imobilirio
e da Construo (IMPIC) and results from the efforts of the
Portuguese government to comply with European open
data policies established in 2004 [39]. Since 2008 and by
decree[40], public administration bodies have to publish
their procurement activity online through BASE [41].
We focus our analysis on a data set comprising 930513
contracts issued between January 2009 and December
2018. Each contract identifies the issuer that buys ser-
vices/goods/works from the supplier. For each contract,
we have collected the following features: issue date, the
value of the contract (in euros), type of contract, and Fis-
cal Numbers of both the issuer and supplier. We analyze
contracts issued by the 278 Municipalities that consti-
tute Continental Portugal. We have not considered mu-
nicipalities in Azores and Madeira archipelagos as they
represent autonomous administrative regions. Since mu-
nicipalities can constitute municipal companies, we have
aggregated all municipalities and respective child com-
panies into a single entity. The aggregation was hand-
curated with support from the Yearly Financial Booklet
of Portuguese Municipalities [42–44]. The pre-processing
steps include:
1. Removing contracts with a value equal or smaller
than one;
2. Identify the Fiscal Number of each Municipality to
use as a primary key;
3. Aggregate municipal companies to the parent Mu-
nicipality;
4. Discard all non Municipality related procurement
contracts;
5. The value of contracts that involve more than one
municipality was split equally among all issuers.
The final dataset comprises 310819 contracts totaling a
value of 16.9 Billion Euros. Panel a) of Figure 1 shows
the monthly number of contracts issued, while panel b)
shows the total value. Vertical lines indicate the dates
of nation-wide municipal elections took place. Through
visual inspection, it is possible to identify a tendency
for municipalities to increase the number of procurement
contracts issued in the months leading to elections. How-
ever, the same does not necessarily translate into an in-
crease in expenditure. Figure 1c) and d) show the spatial
distribution of the total number of contracts and the to-
tal value per municipality.
Each procurement is associated with a type of con-
tract it represents, which follows the standard classifica-
tion from the European Commission [6]: Work contracts
designate contracts whose execution and/or design in-
clude civil engineering works such as roads or sewage
plants; Goods contracts identify contracts that are as-
sociated with the purchase, lease or rental of products
such as vehicles or computers; Service contracts involve
all contracts that have as an object the provision of ser-
vices such as consultancy, training, or cleaning services.
Hence, we have computed the total expenditure in pro-
curement contracts per year for each municipality, as well
as the total expenditure by procurement contract type.
Moreover, since the yearly expenditure is rather noisy,
we have applied a sliding window technique (moving av-
erage) of three years. In that sense, the procurement
values at year y correspond to an average of the values
from years y − 2, y − 1, and y. The reported noise can
have multiple sources. For instance, a municipality might
issue a procurement for the execution of construction in
one year that reflects in the forthcoming yearly budgets
and thus decreases its construction activity in the follow-
ing years.
Finally, we enriched the data set with additional indi-
cators by municipality and year. From Pordata [45] we
have sourced data on Social Integration Income; House
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FIG. 1. a) Number of monthly procurement issued between 2009 and 2019 by Portuguese municipalities. b) Total value in
euros derived from procurement, monthly issued by the Portuguese municipalities between 2009 and 2019. In both a) and b),
each bar corresponds to a month/year and vertical red lines indicate Municipal elections held nationwide. c) Spatial distribution
of the total number of issued procurement by municipality. d) Spatial distribution of the total value spent in procurement
contracts per municipality, between 2009 and 2019. Azores and Madeira archipelagos are omitted and have not been used in
the analysis. At the time the research was conducted data for 2019 was incomplete, contracts of that year were not included
in the analysis and in the discussion of results.
Prices; Number of Public Workers; Total Births; Number
of Large Corporations; Number of Divorces; Amount of
Credit; Number of Medical Doctors; Number of Culture
Attendees; Imports and Exports Volumes; and Environ-
ment Expenses. While on INE[38] [47] – ATM With-
drawals, Municipal Property Tax, Volume of Business in
Accommodation, Catering, and Retail; Individual Gross
Income; Average Salary of Full-Time Workers;
SCALING LAWS OF PROCUREMENT
EXPENDITURE
We start by comparing the estimated scaling coeffi-
cients from municipal procurement activity with those
estimated from a wide set of socio-economic indicators.
The coefficients have been estimated independently for
each year between 2011 and 2018. Figure 2a shows the
average coefficient (Y-Axis) per indicator (X-Axis) with
error bars representing the standard deviation.
In general the obtained scaling coefficients are in-
line with previous findings in the USL literature, thus
supporting the choice of analysis at the municipality
level. Namely, a super-linear behaviour is observed for
the volume of imports (β = 2.05 ± 0.12) and exports
(β = 1.79 ± 0.10), number of medical doctors (β =
1.38 ± 0.01), volume of business from retail except car
sales (β = 1.21±0.01), amount of credit (β = 1.21±0.04),
municipal property tax (β = 1.19± 0.05), number of di-
vorces (β = 1.18 ± 0.02), total volume of house mort-
gages (β = 1.17±0.02), volume of business from catering
(β = 1.16 ± 0.03), number of workers (β = 1.16 ± 0.01),
number of births (β = 1.15 ± 0.02), ATM withdrawals
(β = 1.14 ± 0.01), self-reported gross income (β =
1.10± 0.01), and reported crime (β = 1.08± 0.04). Lin-
ear scaling is observed for total volume of business from
accommodation (β = 0.99 ± 0.05). Sub-linear scaling is
observed for energy consumption (β = 0.88± 0.006), so-
cial integration income (β = 0.97 ± 0.03), environment
expenses (β = 0.84± 0.06), number of large corporations
(β = 0.81 ± 0.04), number of culture attendees (β =
0.70± 0.13), number of public workers (β = 0.70± 0.06),
and house prices (β = 0.47± 0.02).
Figure 2b–c explores more in detail the results ob-
tained from the total procurement expenses per munic-
ipality. Figure 2b shows the yearly change in the scal-
ing coefficient, which exhibits an upward temporal trend.
Light colored points indicate scaling coefficients esti-
mated when considering all municipalities, while dark-
colored considers only municipalities with a population
size larger than 104. Figure 2c shows a representative
example of the scaling behavior from the year 2018. Fur-
ther, it shows the impact of including (lighter) or not
(darker) municipalities with a population lower than 104
in the estimation. In all cases, the coefficient shows a
sub-linear relationship between the total public procure-
ment expenditure and population size.
Figure 3 extends the analysis done in Figure 2b and
Figure 2c to different procurement contract types: Ser-
vices, Goods, and Works. Like in Figure 2. Light colors
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FIG. 2. a) Average scaling coefficients for multiple socio-economic metrics (Black) and all procurement expenses (red).
Moreover, we also show the coefficients obtained for the different types of procurement contracts: works (blue), goods (yellow),
and services (purple). Error bars indicate the standard deviations of estimated coefficients for the different years. Panel b)
shows the yearly changes in the scaling coefficients for procurement activity. Panel c) exemplifies the identified relationships
between the procurement expenditure (euros) and population size for the year of 2018. In panels b) and c) we highlight the
results for municipalities with more than 104 residents.
refer to the entire set of municipalities, while darker col-
ors represent the sample of municipalities with a popula-
tion size larger than 104. Figure 3a–c shows the scaling
relationships in the year of 2018 for all three types of
procurement contracts. As with the results in Figure 2c,
Goods and Works contracts show an evident sub-linear
scaling. In contrast, Services show an almost linear re-
lationship if only the most populated municipalities are
considered but a sub-linear relationship when the entire
set is under consideration.
Moreover, in Figure 3d–f, we show that, unlike the re-
sults in Figure 2b, the yearly upward trend of the scaling
coefficient is absent in Goods and Works contracts. How-
ever, for Works contracts, exhibit a transition, around
2014/16, between two regimes. Such behavior is not
necessarily surprising. The transition matches the time
when Portugal left the bailout program and can be an
indication of the impact that the program had on pub-
lic contracts. However, a causal relationship between the
reported phenomena and its context requires a more ex-
tensive analysis, which is not within the scope of this
work.
Figure 3g–i explores the impact of removing (from
right to left) sequentially the least populated municipal-
ities in the estimation of the scaling coefficient (Y-axis).
We expect two limiting scenarios: First, when we only
consider the most populated municipalities, large varia-
tions on the estimated scaling coefficients as the addi-
tion/removal of observations will impact significantly in
the regression; Secondly, given the over-representation
of small municipalities and the fact that we are using a
logarithmic scale, removing smaller municipalities should
lead to small corrections in the scaling estimation. We
identify the domain of these two scenarios with a shaded
background in Figure 3g–i. However, in between these
two limiting scenarios, we observe an interval where the
scaling coefficient is stable and resilient to the addi-
tion/removal of observations. In that regime, we qual-
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FIG. 3. Panels a–c) Scaling relationships between total procurement expenses, by type, in 2018 and population size. Panels
d–e) Scaling coefficient per year and type of expenses. Panels g–i) show the estimated scaling coefficient for each contract
type when only the nth most populated municipalities are used to estimate the scaling coefficient. In other words, is as if we
are removing the least populated municipalities from the right to the left. Error bars indicate the standard deviation of the
estimated scaling coefficient. In panels a–e) lighter colors indicate the analysis conducted on all Municipalities, darker colors
on the subset of municipalities with a population greater or equal to 104. Each column indicates results for a different type of
contract: Services (left); Goods (middle); and Works (right). In Panels d–f) lines indicate the best linear model but should
only serve as a guideline.
itatively observe the same relationship between the esti-
mated coefficients of the three types of contracts: Ser-
vices with higher coefficients close to one and Works has
the lowest coefficients around 0.75.
In the remaining of the manuscript, we will focus our
analysis on the entire set of municipalities. Such choice
provides a more comprehensive picture of the regional
dynamics at play among Portuguese municipalities.
SCALE-ADJUSTED INDICATORS
One major challenge when developing a comparative
analysis of regional data relates to how an indicator scales
along the dimension of analysis (e.g., region area, pop-
ulation size, etc.). For instance, it is common to com-
pare regions on a per capita basis. However, such scal-
ing/assumption is only accurate if the indicator under
study scales linearly with population size. Since that is
not the case for most indicators, see Figure 2, we can
end up with erroneous conclusions. In that sense, Urban
Scaling literature proposes using, instead, the residuals
of each region from the specific scaling law as a refer-
ence model. In our case, the residuals indicate which
municipalities spend more/less in procurement contracts
according to what is expected from their population size.
In that sense, we follow by estimating the so-called
Scale-Adjusted Indicators (SAI) [8, 31, 48] as a means
to quantify deviations of each municipality procurement
activity from what would be expected from its population
size. The SAI correspond to the residuals, which are
computed as
SAIi,t = log10
Yi,t
Y (Ni,t)
(2)
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FIG. 4. Distributions of Scale-Adjusted Indicators (SAI). Bars show the distribution of SAIs for 2018, curves show the best
fitted Normal Distribution to the SAI data for each year. With the exception of the observations for one year and one type
of contract (Goods in 2014) the hypothesis that SAI follow a normal distribution cannot be disproved using Cramrvon Mises
criterion at the p-value = 0.05 threshold.
where Yi,t is the observed expenditure of municipality i
on year t, and Y (Ni,t) is the predicted value given the
population size of such municipality. Unlike per capita
indicators, the SAI are dimensionless and independent
of population size [8, 31, 48]. The SAI capture human
and social dynamics specific to a given place and time.
It is a true local measure that allows direct comparison
between two regions and provides meaningful compar-
ative information between population agglomerates and
regional governance bodies. One interesting application
of the SAI has been in the development of rankings that
allow quantifying an indicator of interest [8]. In the Sup-
porting Information, we provide a discussion of such an
application to the procurement activity in Portugal.
Figure 4 above shows the distribution of SAI obtained
for different types of contracts for 2018 and the best fit
Normal Distribution for the SAI estimated per year. In
all but one case, SAI are Normally Distributed. More-
over, the SAI are uncorrelated with population size and
show no heteroscedasticity.
Procurement Activity and Regional Economic
Activity
Next we inspect how procurement activity relates to
regional economic activity, which we capture through a
wide range of indicators commonly used to estimate pur-
chasing power [47]. To that end, we estimate the Pearson
correlation between the SAI associated with procurement
activity by contract type – Services, Goods, and Works
– and the SAI obtained from regional economic indica-
tors such as: the average salary of full-time works; self-
reported individual gross income; total volume of ATM
withdrawals; total value collected from Municipal prop-
erty tax; the number of workers; total amount of loans;
Volume of Business activities in Accommodation, Cater-
ing, and Retail (excluding car sales).
Figure 5 shows the yearly correlations between the pro-
curement SAI and regional indicators. In all panels, the
Y-axis indicates the Pearson correlation, and X-axis rep-
resents the year of analysis. Each curve’s color indicates
the type of procurement contract, and each panel de-
picts the results for a particular regional economic activ-
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FIG. 5. Correlations between the Scale-Adjusted Indicators of Public Procurement Activity and Regional Indicators of Economic
Activity.
ity indicator. Surprisingly, Works procurement contracts
exhibit null to negative correlation in most indicators.
Exceptions are in the number of workers and the total
volume of loans. This interesting finding raises questions
on the impact of public procurement work contracts as
an effective policy instrument that we believe deserves
future work. These results show that different types of
public procurement might spill over to different economic
dimensions in different ways. In contrast, Services and
Goods procurement contracts show a stable positive cor-
relation with most indicators.
More importantly, these results show that there ex-
ists a link between procurement activity and the regional
economy. In that sense, such economic indicators can be
used effectively as monitoring proxies for the evaluation
of public policy programs. Moreover, the short analysis
also supports the potential of using procurement SAI as
an explanatory variable in models that look to under-
stand the importance and relevance of different types of
public procurement activity in the local economy.
Regional Divide
One application of Scale-Adjusted Indicators is to iden-
tify and compare patterns between groups of regions. By
helping to identify commonalities but also exceptions, it
can aid policymakers in pushing the adequate policies
for regional development [49]. In that sense, Portugal
is marked by different regional development profiles re-
lated to the natural, social, and economic diversity that
loosely runs from North to South and its urban system
anchored on two main metropolitan areas (Lisbon and
Porto). On the other hand, the country deals with sub-
stantial challenges stemming from significant migration
movements towards coastal regions (and the ongoing de-
cline in population growth) that, in time, amplified ter-
ritorial disparities mainly marked by the dichotomy of
Interior/Coastal regions [50–54].
In light of such regional realities in Portugal, it is inter-
esting to investigate whether public procurement activi-
ties reveal some of these well-known dichotomies, which
means if differences among the described groups exhibit
different and distinguishable patterns. To that end, and
as a first exercise, we grouped municipalities according
to whether they are located in the Coast/Interior or the
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North/South of Portugal[46]. We defined as Coastal mu- nicipalities all those that have a coastline or that are
9enclaves of municipalities with a coastline, else they are
categorized as Interior. Moreover, we used the coordi-
nates of each municipality capital as a point of reference
to classify them as being in the North or South. In partic-
ular, we classified as North the 140 municipalities whose
city coordinates are the northernmost; the remaining 138
are classified as being in the South. Figure 6c shows the
classification of each municipality.
Figure 6a–b compares the differences (∆) in the pro-
curement SAI activity between different groups of mu-
nicipalities. In particular, Figure 6a compares North and
South municipalities (∆ = SAINORTH − SAISOUTH) and
Figure 6a compares Coastal and Interior municipalities
(∆ = SAICOASTAL − SAIINTERIOR).
In Figure 6a a positive/negative difference means
that Northern/Southern municipalities exhibit in aver-
age larger/smaller SAI than their counterpart. From
Figure 6a we observe that there is a clear dichotomy that
characterized by the common perceptions and differences
between Northern and Southern regions, in that, North-
ern municipalities tend to exhibit larger average SAI in
Works while Southern are characterized by larger SAI in
Services and Goods. These patterns remain qualitatively
the same, although Services procurement contracts seem
to been converging to parity between the two groups.
In Figure 6b a positive/negative difference means
that Coastal/Interior municipalities exhibit in average
larger/smaller SAI than their counterpart. Once again,
results show that there are clear differences between both
these regions, in particular Coastal municipalities tend
to have higher SAI in Goods and Services procurement
contracts, while Works contracts have evolved from being
larger in the Interior to reach parity since 2016.
Figure 6d–f shows the spatial distribution of the 2018
SAI across the Portuguese municipalities for each type of
procurement contracts. We set the color range to be the
same in all three cases. Interestingly, the distribution
of SAI does not map directly into the regional groups
that we have analyzed above; that is, we cannot clearly
distinguish between North/South and Coastal/Interior.
Instead, they show a more heterogeneous spatial distri-
bution.
Grouping municipalities can provide interesting in-
sights into existing differences among regions. In that
sense, the SAI can be the basis to identify clusters of mu-
nicipalities with similar procurement activity patterns.
To that end, we clustered municipalities using the K-
Means algorithm to identify the four clusters of munici-
palities with similar activity patterns. We performed the
cluster by considering that each observation consisted of
the estimated SAI of each type of procurement per mu-
nicipality per year. See the Supplementary Information
for more information about the clustering procedure.
We have identified four main groups of municipali-
ties that we refer to as clusters I, II, III, and IV. Fig-
ure 7a shows the spatial distribution of clusters esti-
mated from procurement activity. It does not stem from
pre-conceived perceptions of historical, geographical, or
demographic nature and translates the information re-
vealed by the municipalities’ procurement activity. Nat-
urally, it presents clusters with higher spatial variance,
contrary to the analysis conducted above. Figure 7b–e
shows the yearly average SAI for each procurement type
in each cluster. Cluster I is characterized by average pos-
itive SAI in Works and average low negative SAI in Ser-
vices and Goods. Cluster II is characterized by strongly
negative SAI in Works and nearly null SAI in Services
and Goods. Cluster III is characterized by municipalities
with strongly negative SAI in all three types of contracts.
Finally, cluster IV is defined by municipalities with mod-
erately positive SAI in all procurement contract types.
Clusters I and IV show, respectively, a predominance of
Northern and Southern municipalities. Clusters II and
III are more geographically disperse.
The SAI can thus help identify different regions with
different activity patterns. However, a more robust anal-
ysis of the factors underlying such differences is needed.
CONCLUSIONS
Having the correct methodology for comparative re-
gional analysis of procurement activity is critical for ef-
fective and inclusive policymaking. However, it is often
challenging to develop accurate indicators when these do
not scale linearly with, for example, population size. We
proposed using methods from Urban Scaling Laws to an-
alyze procurement activities among 278 Portuguese mu-
nicipalities and by contract type.
We have characterized the scaling coefficient of pro-
curement activity and put it at a glance with an array of
other indicators. Municipal procurement activity tends
to scale sub-linearly with population size, meaning that
increasing the population size lowers the value spent per
capita in public contracts. Such behavior is true for both
the total value spent in public procurement and specific
types of contracts.
Looking at the yearly variation of the scaling coeffi-
cients, we identified a trend that suggests an increase in
the coefficient that is mostly associated with a regime
transition in the Works procurement contracts, whose
coefficient jumped from ≈ 0.7 to ≈ 0.85 around 2014/16.
Moreover, looking at individual deviations from the
scaling laws, we have explored its usefulness in char-
acterizing different regional groups’ profiles. In that
sense, we have shown that the SAI captures interesting
differences between regional groups – North/South and
Coastal/Interior – of municipalities. The SAI also pro-
vides an alternative to estimate the adequate groups in
terms of similarity of procurement activity. We show that
the resulting groups/clusters of municipalities present
different procurement activity patterns and a non-trivial
organization in the Portuguese geography. Results that
we believe are worth exploring in future research and re-
inforce the potential usefulness of these methods in better
understanding regional dynamics in a country.
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FIG. 7. Clustering of Municipalities according to the Scale-Adjusted Indicators patterns. Panel a) associates municipalities to
a cluster. Panels b–e) show the average SAI in the different procurement contract types – Works (blue), Services (purple), and
Goods (yellow) – allowing to characterize the procurement activity patterns of each cluster.
Although previous works have analyzed procurement
data [7], they have done it so in relatively smaller sam-
ples that are constrained to the larger procurement con-
tracts in that country. In that sense, and to the best of
our knowledge, we performed the analysis of a large and
complete public procurement data set was analyzed.
Ongoing work aims at developing a more robust model
to understand the link between public procurement ac-
tivity at the regional level and economic development.
Such work should develop a more robust model that al-
lows controlling for other relevant factors [56]. More-
over, future work should also extend this analysis to other
countries and regions, particularly European public pro-
curement repositories. The latter would allow us to val-
idate the identified similarities and differences in behav-
iors across countries with different processes and cultures.
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